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I.    US Supreme Court Petition for Certiorari

 

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Does the
denial of substantive adjudication constitute denial of meaningful access
to the courts?

2
Should states be held accountable for intentionally depriving a resident
meaningful post filing access to its civil courts if certain criteria are
met?

3  If
question two is affirmative, what is the statute of  limitations and
accrual period to be applied in this and other matters pled directly from
US and State Constitutions and not involving personal injury tort,  42 USCS
Sec 1983, Laws against Discrimination, and Bivens claims.

4.  If
question two is affirmative, shouldn’t a resident be  entitled to damages
for loss of one’s due process and equal  protection rights in themselves as
well as compensatory damages and damages for emotional and physical
distress, as afforded in  42 USCS 1983 actions?

5.  Is it a question
of first impression that a state defendant be held accountable in its own
court by a resident previously deprived of  meaningful access to its civil
courts, not in error.

6.   Did the lower
court err when it counted the time for the statute of limitations?

7.
Should the entire matter have been dismissed based  upon the accrual
period in the car matter, when the two other matters could have been brought
separately and are within the court’s same period of accrual?

8.    Does
a plaintiff get meaningful access to the courts  if  judges
dismiss the action for reasons that are unsupported and which are
affirmed on appeal?

9.   Is an appraisal
report or other special showing  required to gain standing, pre-discovery
to have zoning and other laws reasonably enforced within 200 feet of one’s
property?

10. Should
credibility and existence of oral agreements and other intangible evidence
immune from review, be allowed to replace hard evidence in making
decisions?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner
resident sued State and its Superior Court in State Court on August 26, 2002 for
purposeful and egregious denial of substantive adjudication in two earlier civil
matters.

Prior to
this on May 30, 2000, petitioner attempted a common law constitutional action in
federal court for injunctive relief and damages (Docket C-OD-2567 and Appeal
Docket 00-3676 – third circuit ) which was dismissed based upon 11^th
Amendment immunity and the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. (Petitioner argued that as
actual adjudication of issues and findings were lacking and unresolved issues
remained, Rooker Feldman should not apply).

Petitioner also corresponded with the NJ Administrative
Office of the Courts (AOC), the Division of Criminal Justice and the chairman of
the Senate Judiciary Committee as to the lack of adjudication and possible
corruption involved in these matters.

Petitioner’s April 22, 2002 letter to the chair of Senate
Judiciary Committee seeks state police investigation as to why the zoning laws
are palpably not being enforced.

Though no exhaustion of remedies is required for
constitutional actions, i.e. under 42 USCS sec. 1983, petitioner has done
so.

The issue is whether a remedy exists when a state acts in
bad faith to deprive a resident of meaningful access to its courts, post filing.
This is not to be confused or equated with wrongful decisions made in good faith
for which the remedy of appeals, hopefully heard in good faith, exists. [The
State Appellate Div does not care to make the distinction and self-servingly
spins the matter as one of plaintiff simply being a dissatisfied litigant; “In
two counts, Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that State defendants deliberately
wronged him by issuing adverse rulings in two civil lawsuits in which he was a
party” (Appellate Div opinion)] Petitioner maintains he has yet to receive one
substantive bite at the apple where all laws are applied to him as to
others on the real issues in question. Petitioner further claims this is not in
error and has resulted in the following perverse decisions:

In the first matter,
Petitioner had to pay someone for the privilege of  storing their car for
them for three years though they caused the problem at issue and would neither
remove a car or pay any storage fees. The adversary’s admitted knowledge of the
closing on Petitioner’s building coincides with the sending of
Petitioner’s two certified letters which inform him about the closing date and
the need to remove or pay storage fees. (See Appendix  F  for detailed
excerpts from the verified complaint)

In the second matter, a 42
USCS sec. 1983 action, Long Branch, its mayor and business administrator and the
Long Branch Sewerage Authority and its executive director were defendants.
Petitioner was to pay for all engineering and costs of extending the sewer main
to his property while his neighbors immediately adjacent to him upstream had
only to pay connection and usage fees to obtain service. Also, Petitioner was
denied standing, (without a hearing),  for even ordinary equitable relief
to have zoning laws enforced on properties immediately adjacent to and across
the street from his own commercial property,  and was retaliated
against by Long Branch for seeking enforcement of ordinances. The trial court
allowed Long Branch to stall and evade follow-up interrogatories and failed to
adjudicate or render findings on 12 remaining counts of the complaint while
substituting itself as jury on the one count it adjudicated regarding selective
enforcement. (Virtually all the judges assigned to the matter either come from
the vicinity of defendant Long Branch or appear to have some connection to Long
Branch and its Sewerage Authority and their respective attorney’s law firm and
the Long Branch Mayor or to those looking out for Plaintiff‘s neighbor) The
Appellate Div. affirms that Plaintiff “has no standing to claim dereliction
in the enforcement of ordinances”, (Appendix A ) yet questions Petitioner
during oral “argument”  (no rebuttal allowed) about whether the neighbors
had any permits, thus demonstrating his true standing.  Under the
Land Use Act, it is well known that those within 200 feet of a property
proposing certain improvements are automatically deemed to have standing to
receive notice and to comment/object at zoning hearings without need for
appraisals or other arbitrary impediments to prove standing. An appraisal was
later submitted as part of discovery and showed damages attributable to Long
Branch’s failure to enforce the zoning ordinances. It was nevertheless ignored
by the trial court. Long Branch is an active participant in allowing the one
neighbor to evade the permitting process for the illegal nonconforming use which
continues to increase. (The neighbor,  an asphalt contractor, received many
summonses around 1997 from a zoning officer since terminated, and subsequently
filed two site plans which were dismissed for lack of prosecution) The
refusal to enforce is palpably unreasonable (no limitation of resources was ever
argued by Long Branch ) and therefore illegal and corrupt to all, it seems, but
the NJ courts. The state department of environmental protection (DEP)  was
notified that petitioner’s neighbor  has paved and improved and is
stockpiling dirt  and other materials adjacent to a brook without permits,
in violation of DEP and land use regulations prohibiting development within 100
feet of a flowing body of water. Instead of enforcing the law, they sought to
retaliate against petitioner’s business under the guise of a new inspection
program. (See Appendix F for further details)

Following
the second matter, the lower court improperly ordered Plaintiff to pay $3022.93
in costs including Supreme Court and Appellate Div. Costs, contrary to current
statutes and against strong state policy to settle (the parties had earlier
executed a voluntary settlement which disposed of all issues). (See Appendix F
for details)

Petitioner believes the
trial judge, who professed experience in deciding many costs motions, was
improperly using the occasion to exact revenge for personal reasons,
specifically for Plaintiff’s criticism of and reporting to AOC of his fellow
Monmouth judges. He still serves in Monmouth,. though the Director of AOC, a
judge, was notified about this, as well. Nevertheless, after 3 cost hearings at
taxpayer’s expense, Long Branch then withdrew the awarded costs in return for
Plaintiff’s promise not to sue for breach of contract or further appeal the
costs Order. The court had nothing to do with this settlement and its actions
are not justified nor serve any legitimate State purpose.

Though the
costs issue and the sewer matter may be moot as to the main extension (the
sewerage authority still fails to return $1050 for engineering of the main)
Petitioner nonetheless seeks damages for loss of his due process and
equal  protection and property rights in themselves, as well as
compensatory damages and damages for emotional and physical distress, as
available under 42 USCS 1983 and Bivens actions. (“42 USCS sec. 1983
Plaintiff is entitled to receive compensatory damages for loss of inherent value
of rights under establishment clause of First Amendment violated by defendants,
even if plaintiff is unable to demonstrate consequential injury” Bell v.
Little Axe Indep. School Dist. 766 F2d 1391 (1985 CA10 Okla),. “Federal law
sanctions recovery of compensatory damages that include recovery for
nonpecuniary  injuries such as emotional distress, humiliation,
embarrassment, personal indignity, loss of personal and business reputation, and
loss of enjoyment of life, caused by violation of constitutional rights”
Florey v. District Court 713 P2d 840 (Colo. 1985) “Claims of violation of
constitutional right of due process, including court access – or other
fundamental constitutional rights – do not require proof of actual injury”
Messere v. Fair, 752 F. Supp. 48)  Petitioner’s common law complaint
pled directly upon sections of the US and NJ constitutions and did not invoke 42
USCS sec 1983 or name judges since the State is not a person amenable to 1983
action and judges are immune in their official capacity. (Appendix  F ) The
civil case information statement (CIS) had both  “constitutional and tort
claim seeking damages” as the case description.

In keeping with federal and
state Rules, the verified and amended complaints  fairly apprised the
adverse party of the Constitutional claims and issues raised.

The trial
court attempted to find several grounds for dismissing the entire complaint,
pre-discovery,  before finally settling upon use of a faulty accrual date
and exceeding the 2 year state personal injury statute of limitation as the best
way to achieve its obvious, predetermined goal of dismissal. Based upon this
faulty procedural dismissal, it then denied Plaintiff the right to amend his
complaint. Nevertheless, the last * two matters fall within the court’s own two
year period and were similarly dismissed along with the earliest matter.(See
transcripts, appendix D) The dismissal was affirmed in full on appeal (Appendix
A) and certification to the NJ Supreme Court was denied (Appendix C).

Petitioner
argued that as neither count of the complaint pled  42 USCS S 1983, and the
first count made no mention of the tort claim act,  dismissal based upon an
accrual time which applies to those matters is arbitrary and denies justice.
(The court and defendants submit only personal injury and 42 USCS S 1983 cases
to support the dismissal) It is clear that for constitutional torts brought
pursuant to 42 USCS S 1983 (i.e Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct.
1938).and Bivens complaints, (i.e., King v. One Unknown Fed. Corrections
Officer, 201 F.3d 910, “The statute of limitations for both sec. 1983 and
Bivens actions is determined by the statute of limitations for personal injury
actions in the state where the incident forming the basis of the claim
occurred”) the state personal injury statue of limitations  is to be
borrowed with the time of accrual to be  based upon federal law.
Though similar to Bivens in that Petitioner pleads directly upon sections of
federal and state constitutions, no such cases can be found which name State as
defendant for denial of due process, equal protection, substantive adjudication
or meaningful access to the courts, post filing, in civil matters. Therefore, it
can be argued that the statute of limitations deriving from federal common law
and which is to be the same in all states, could apply to Petitioner’s common
law complaint. See US v. Schwartz, 7897 F.2d 257 (1986) wherein
“Supervisory power of federal courts is power to formulate rules of common law
when neither Constitution nor statute supplies rules of

______________________________________________________________

* The third issue ripened on August 29, 2003 and appears
in the second and third amended complaints. (See Appendix F page 44)

decision”.
However Kobatake v. E.I Dupont De Nemours & Co.,162 F.3d 619 (C.A. 11
Ga. 1998) rehearing denied, certiorari denied, 120 S. Ct. 284, indicates
application  only to those matters “concerned with the rights and
obligations of the US, interstate and international disputes implicating
conflicting rights of States or relations with foreign nations and admiralty
cases”  However, as demonstrated by the egregious refusal to apply
operative law and recent occurrence of the costs matter (August 29, 2003), the
deprivations can be considered continuous. (The zoning violations and unequal
enforcement of laws by Long Branch is also ongoing and continuous and the
statute of limitations has not yet even begun.) “In most federal causes of
action, when defendant’s conduct is part of continuing practice, action is
timely so long as last act evidencing continuing practice falls within
limitations period” 287 Corporate Center Associates v. Bridgewater, 101
F.3d 320 (1996), See also Farbenfabriken Bayer, A.G. v. Sterling Drug,
Inc. 153 f. Supp. 589, 197 F. Supp 627, affirmed 307 F2d 210, cert. denied.)

Nevertheless should the court
grant the Petition and thereafter determine that a states personal injury
statute of limitation should apply, the time of accrual utilized by the trial
court does not comply with federal law as the actual “injury” did not occur
until funds were turned over in the car matter. (See below “Reasons for Granting
Writ”)

Raising
of Federal Questions [Rule 14 (g) (i)]:

Petitioner
raises the federal questions of meaningful access, equal protection and due
process in the trial court in the verified complaint. See Appendix F pages
32&33,

and pages
40-43, 45 & 46 (all relevant portions in bold)

The trial
court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim due primarily to
exceeding of the statute of limitations

The
Legal basis of Petitioners Complaint:

Petitioner
essentially claims he has been deprived of his property and rights without due
process, due to a denial of meaningful access to the courts (substantive
adjudication)  in violation of U.S.C.A. 7^th and 14^th
amendments and sections of the NJ Constitution. (See pleadings as referenced in
“Raising of Federal Questions, preceding.

Petitioner
only seeks that state and federal laws and court rules be applied to him as to
other litigants. Petitioner is entitled to assume that the Rule of Law is to
be  followed in this state and country,  as regularly attested to by
the President in appealing to dictatorships. Mackenzie v. City of
Rockledge, 920 F.2d 1554 holds  “Unequal application of state law may
violate equal protection clause.” (U.S.C.A Const. Amend 14)

In Hennigh v. City of
Shawnee, 155 F3d 1249 held that ”’procedural due process’” ensures that a
state will not deprive a person of life, liberty or property unless fair
procedures are used in making that decision, while ‘substantive due process’
guarantees that the state will not deprive a person of those rights for an
arbitrary reason regardless how fair the procedures are that are used in making
the decisions.”   In Howard v Grinage, 82 F3d 1343, held
“’Substantive due process’ serves goal of preventing governmental power from
being used for purposes of oppression, regardless of the fairness of  the
procedures used.”

In
Felker v. Christine, 796 F. Supp. 135, affirmed 983 F.2d 1050  held
“’substantive due process violations’ are generally those that are so arbitrary
and unreasonable that they lack substantial relation to public health, safety
and welfare.“

Meaningful access to the
courts:

As held in
Cochran v. Pinchak, 401 F.3d 184, 30 NDLR P5, (3d Cir N.J., Mar. 15,
2005) “A State’s robust due-process obligation to provide meaningful access to
the courts is much more expansive that the wide latitude a State enjoys in equal
protection cases that do not involve a suspect classification or a fundamental
right.” Unlike equal protection claims,  meaningful access does not depend
on the existence of similar classes similarly treated to achieve vindication.
Tennessee v. Lane 124 S. Ct 1978 (2004) also indicates that damages due
to denial of meaningful access are not impaired by a state claiming
11^th amendment immunity.

Criminals
have a right to meaningful access to the courts pre and post incarceration and
are provided a remedy by way of 42 U.S.C.S. S 1983 and habeas corpus to effect
this right. “Due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment guarantees state inmates
right to adequate, effective, and meaningful access to courts. Petrick v.
Maynard, 11 F3d 991 (C.A. 10 Okla. 1993) “For equal protection purposes,
access to the courts is a fundamental right.” Imprisoned Citizens Union v.
Shapp, 11 F.Supp 2d 586, affirmed 169 F3d 178.See also Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S. Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977) Johnson v.
Avery, 393 U.S. 483, Younger v. Gilmore, 404 US 15 (1971), Ex
Parte Hull, 312 US 546 (1941) finding that the right to habeas corpus is
not to be impaired by the state.

This right
afforded to criminals also serves as the basis for vindicating other meaningful
access claims and  rights, pre-filing of the complaint. It also extends
beyond providing physical access. As held in Germany v. Vance, 868
F.2d 9 (1^st Cir. 1989), a 42 USCS sec 1983 matter, “It can be a
deprivation “of life, liberty or property, without due process of law” in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, for state officials to deny a person
“access to the courts.” citing from Bounds v. Smith . See also Rogan
v. City of Boston, 267 F.3d 24, 28 (1^st cir. 2001) which relies
on this same citation as found in Germany v. Vance.  In Swekel v.
City of River Rouge, 119 F.3d 1259, 1262 (6^th Cir. 1997), “The
right of access in its most formal manifestation protects a persons right to
physically access the court system. Without more, however, such an important
right would ring hollow in the halls of justice” (emphasis added) citing
Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148. ( “In an
organized society it is the right conservative of all other rights, and lies at
the foundation of orderly government. It is one of the highest and most
essential privileges of citizenship…”) “Access to courts does not only protect
one’s right to physically enter the courthouse halls, but also insures that
the access to courts will be “’adequate, effective and meaningful.’” citing
Bounds v. Smith at 822.

As further
found in Swekel at 1263, “A court must analyze several factors before
deciding whether a person’s fundamental right of access to the courts has been
violated. First, a court must ascertain whether the abuse occurred pre- or post-
filing. When alleged violation of right of access to courts transpires
post-filing, the aggrieved party is already in court and that court usually can
address the abuse, and thus, an access to courts claim typically will not be
viable.” citing Bounds v. Smith at 1495.  As the within matter
demonstrates, however, the court will not address the abuse when it is itself a
Defendant and the cause of the abuse, making  the within action
necessary..

It
therefore follows that denial of substantive due process post-filing is a denial
of meaningful access and must be subject to vindication using a meaningful
accrual period and statute of limitations.

Regarding whether this
action is cognizable under the New Jersey Constitution, as held in
Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 389 A2d 465 at [15]  (1978
NJ Supreme. Ct.), “Both the majority and the dissent in King v. So. Jersey
Nat. Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 177, 193-194, 330 A2d 1 (1974), concluded that this
Court has the power to enforce rights recognized by the New Jersey Constitution,
even in the absence of implementing legislation” (emphasis added) citing other
cases therein. (Tort Notice,  42 USCS sec 1983, naming of individuals or
judges are not required to vindicate one’s constitutional rights or cause for
dismissal of a complaint for lack thereof. ) Under [16] held “While the NJ
Constitution (1947) like its1844 predecessor, has no specific equal protection
clause analogous to that in the Fourteenth Amendment, our State Constitutions
have been construed to provide analogous or superior protections to our
citizens. In fact, Art. 1, para. 1 has been most frequently referred to as the
basis of our Constitution’s equal protection guarantees.”, citing other cases
therein.

 REASONS FOR GRANTING
THE WRIT

I. The
within matter demonstrates the need for a remedy in order to promote justice,
deter corruption,  and enable accountability of the state and its judiciary
for good cause shown.

A basic flaw exists in our
judicial system, especially in states where judicial elections, which can impart
some accountability,  do not exist.  There is no guarantee that judges
will always act in good faith and provide substantive adjudication, especially
when they think they can get away with it.

This occurs in New Jersey
because the judges can obtain lifetime tenure after 5 years. Since the US
Supreme Court hears only about 80 or so cases a year, there is certainly no
credible deterrent to the courts doing anything they want. Furthermore, even
though this esteemed US Supreme Court may have already decided an issue and made
law, the State courts may still purposely misinterpret or ignore this under
guise of error, which necessitates further appeals on these issues already
decided as law. It also occurs due to a lack of credible deterrent and
supervision by the State itself. The Senate Judiciary Committee which has
control over the selection and removal of judges is controlled by attorneys who
make their living practicing law before these same judges. This explains why
judges in NJ are seldom, if ever, removed for failing to do their job and
provide substantive adjudication. The key court personnel are chosen and
supervised by the supreme court justice with, it seems, the main objective of
keeping the public in the dark as much as possible.

Similar to the use of
attorneys and awarding of counsel fees  under 42 USCS S 1988 as “an army of
attorney generals”  in vindicating client’s constitutional rights against
state officials,  another mechanism is needed against a state itself acting
in bad faith to deny justice. And if a court should still not yet take this
seriously and properly hear that matter, perhaps a summary method could be
employed pursuant to Rule  20 and monitored pursuant to Rule 22, with heavy
fines issuing for noncompliance. Monitoring by a federal district judge in
conjunction with the US Justice Department could also be employed. This was done
recently in New Jersey due to racial profiling by the State
police.

In order to allay the
court’s fear of a flood of copycat cases without merit, Petitioner submits
criteria that can be used to distinguish worthy cases. (All are present in the
within matter) The use of these actions coupled with a willingness by the high
court circuit judge or district judge to intervene as above will serve to
reduce, rather than increase, the number of appeals. Through public pressure it
will lead to elections and other needed judicial reforms in offending states.

1.
Decisions which are unjust on their face and repugnant to the interests of
justice such as having to pay to store someone else’s car for three years when
they caused the problem, denying of a hearing and standing pre-discovery to have
zoning laws enforced within 200 feet of one’s property, and refusing to decide
costs according to current statutes.

2.
Motions for reconsideration and appeals taken

3.  No
substantive day in court. No findings or adjudication on the actual issues
complained of  and failure to uniformly apply laws despite many motions for
reconsideration made and the laws placed conveniently before the courts.

4. Denial
of Access purposeful, not in error.

As found in
petitioner’s verified complaint;

As all three courts had
these and other “errors” brought to their attention and refused to remedy them
though having the laws conveniently placed before them, and obviously knowing
that not remedied they would deprive Asarnow of his substantive rights, they
can no longer be considered just error. The rubber stamping of the decision
by the higher courts upon “review” while appearing procedurally to afford
due process, further denies actual procedural (fair, impartial) or
substantive due process on these same key issues affecting within Plaintiff’s
substantive rights. Had the conclusions of the trial court and failure to apply
the proper laws been in error, surely these two higher courts would have
corrected this. That they are satisfied that there is no error at the end
of the State process indicates their own willful assent to the arbitrary,
unconscionable deprivation of  Plaintiff Asarnow’s substantive
rights.

5. No other
remedy available –exhaustion of remedies.

6. No jury
– As long as a jury is instructed properly by the
court, and its decision is not against the hard evidence, a
jury decision should be final and this action cannot be
used.

7. No
popular non-partisan elections for judges present.

8.
Hard evidence of record ignored in favor of credibility and other subjective
standards. This can easily be abused and lead to arbitrary and  corrupt
decisions which are unlikely to be disturbed by the upper courts who are also
not accountable.

9. Pattern
of disregard for individual rights as displayed in
more than one matter involving
petitioner or others.

II. The
Statute of Limitations and Accrual period in these particular matters is
unsettled and should be resolved to prevent further denial of justice.

Plaintiff maintains that
these matters may not always be due to a discrete, apparent act, such as in
personal injury, and that time is also needed to determine whether a pattern
exists and to prosecute appeals. Without at least one appeal, it is impossible
to know,  immediately upon judgment/dismissal, whether the failure of due
process is one of  appealable error made in good faith and correctable on
appeal, or one due to intentional wrongdoing and denial of court access. The
statute of limitation and accrual periods needs to take account of this, as it
does in Bivens matters for malicious prosecution where the final act/judgment,
not the earliest, is used as the onset of the accrual period. “While state Law
supplies the limitations period where no stated federal statute of limitations
exists, federal law determines when the period commences” Kronfeld v. First
Jersey Nat. Bank, 638 F. Supp. 1454  As evident in Ruff v.
Runyon, 258 F3d 498, 500  (6^th Cir. 2001) “Under federal law
the statute begins to run when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the
injury which forms the basis of their claims”, Friedman v. Estate of
Presser, 929 F2d 1151, 1159 (6^th cir. 1991) citing Sevier
v. Turner, 742 F2d 262, 273 (6^th Cir. 1984) “This inquiry focuses
on the harm incurred rather than the underlying facts which giver rise to the
harm.” Quoting Shannon v. Recording Indus. Assn. of Amer., 661 F.Supp
205, 210 (S.D. Ohio 1987)”A plaintiff has reason to know of his injury when he
should have discovered it through the exercise of reasonable diligence.”
Sevier at 273. The trial court’s findings are in agreement with this,
however, Petitioner is injured and discovers his constitutional injury only
later, after the State appeal process is exhausted (Jan. 31, 2000 – Car Appeal
denied, May 2, 2000 – certification denied) and he has to turn over the funds
(8/25/00). “A cause of action grounded in tort accrues, not when the
tortuous act occurs, but when the consequential injury or the damage occurs.”
Hermes v. Staiano, 437 A2.d 925, 181 N.J. Super 424
Furthermore, in the within matter, the medical/psychological/emotional symptoms
and distress did not occur until after decisions in both matters and is not the
focus of the entire complaint as the trial court alleges. To expect that upon
judgment in the car matter that all damages suddenly  accrued for both
matters is unreasonable and denies justice, especially since,  the
deprivations may be viewed as continuing and the accrual period may not have
even begun. “Courts will not set aside statute of limitations unless time
allowed is manifestly so insufficient that statute becomes a denial of justice”
Housing Authority of Union County v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 136 A.2d
401, 25 NJ 330. indicating that Statutes of Limitations are not to deny justice.

Petitioner respectfully
suggests that in these matters, accrual begin upon the final order in each
particular matter and that borrowing a state’s personal injury statute is
reasonable for determining the statute of limitations. This would hold as long
as the abuse is not ongoing and continuous.

Nevertheless, the record
shows, the court does not dispute that the within claim is allowable so this
should not be an issue for this court as to the instant matter.

.

III. The accrual
applied in this matter denies justice. The court errs in dismissing the
entire matter. 

Though setting forth the correct standards of review, the
court begins by finding a) the cause of action is allowable and may exist
(4/10/03 T5-25) but could not be inferred/discerned from the facts of the
complaint (4/10/03 T5-15) b) no constitutional claim existed since no person was
named under 1983 (4/10/03 T7-13) c) the entire complaint is a personal injury
matter subject to Tort Claims Act and ascribes a time of accrual intended in
those matters, not the matter at hand (4/10/03 8-9, 9-19).

The First Count of the
original complaint should have survived dismissal and is subject to amendment.
Alternate causes of action are allowed and encouraged. (R. 4:5-2, 4:5-6), The
First Count contains no reference whatsoever to the Tort Claims Act and any
damages sought clearly stem as consequence of the constitutional tort. Bell
v. Hood, 327 US 678, 681 (1946), holds “it is clear that petitioners seeks
recovery squarely on the ground that respondents violated the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments”…It cannot be doubted therefore that it was the pleader’s purpose
to make violation of these constitutional provisions the basis of his suit and
further the party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely
upon” citing The Fair v. Kohler Die Co., 228 US 22.

The Court recognizes and
reaffirms (10/24/03 Tr.5-25) that the original Complaint contains two matters
yet in error ascribes the same accrual date to the second matter involving Long
Branch in order to dismiss both matters. The second matter and the decision on
costs could have each been brought separately with their own accrual dates and
were included together under the entire controversy doctrine.  Using the
trial courts reasoning, the Long Branch matter accrued on January 5, 2001 when
the voluntary withdrawal and final order was entered so an appeal could be had.
Petitioner would have had to sue by January 5, 2003. The order on costs was
entered on 8/29/03.  The within verified complaint was filed 8/26/02, so
Petitioner is well within the time to sue for these. For reasons stated above,
the court’s method of imputing accrual is faulty and all three issues involving
the two matters should not have been dismissed.

CONCLUSION

The
petition for writ of certiorari should be granted in the interests of justice to
provide a remedy for these matters and  to deter corruption in state courts
and agencies.

Date: June
13, 2005

APPENDIX

 

This Court, on
two prior occasions, have denied motions for reconsideration.  The Court
finding that the dismissal of the action was warranted, number one, because the
plaintiff had failed to file requisite notice of claim as to the common law
action.  And, two, with respect to the allegations brought pursuant to 42
USC Section 1983, the defendant must be a person.  And, as a complaint,
name the State of New Jersey and the Superior Court of New Jersey as the only
defendants, they are not persons within the meaning of 42 USC Section
1983.  The Complaint, otherwise, fails to set forth any facts for which a
cause of action could be suggested.

For the reasons
that this Court has previously articulated and its orders of April 10th, 2003,
and July 18th of 2003, the Court finds that there is no merit to the present
action similarly for the reasons that the Court placed on the record on October
24th, 2003, this motion must be denied.  It does not meet the standards for
reconsideration.  Thank you.  That=s it.

* * * * *

CERTIFICATION

     I, DEBRA
L. STOREY, the assigned transcriber, do hereby certify the foregoing transcript
of proceedings on tape number CI-111-04 PSP, index number 5182 to 5453, is
prepared in full compliance with the current Transcript Format for Judicial
Proceedings and is a true and accurate compressed transcript of the proceedings
as recorded, and to the best of my ability.

______________________________  Date:

DEBRA L.
STOREY      AOC #494

J&J COURT TRANSCRIBERS,
INC.

US CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE V

OF CRIMES AND INDICTMENTS.

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise

infamous crime, unless on a presentment    or
indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger, nor
shall any person be subject, for the same offense, to be twice put in jeopardy
of life and limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be witness
against himself; nor to be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law, nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation.

ARTICLE VII.

OF TRIAL BY JURY IN CIVIL CASES.

In
suits at common law, where the value in controversy   shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved; and no fact tried
by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.

ARTICLE XIV.

CITIZENS AND THEIR RIGHTS-14th AMENDMENT.

SECTION
1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. Nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec­tion of
the laws.

APPENDIX E

THE CONSTITUTION OF NEW JERSEY

A
Constitution agreed upon by the delegates of the people of New Jersey, in
Convention, begun at Rutgers University, the State University of New Jersey, in
New Brunswick, on the twelfth day of June, and continued to the tenth day of
Septem­ber, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and
forty-seven.

We, the people of the State of New Jersey, grate­ful to Almighty God for the
civil and religious liberty which He hath so long permitted us to enjoy, and
looking to Him for a blessing upon our endeavors to secure and transmit the same
unimpaired to suc­ceeding. generations, do ordain and establish this
Constitution.

ARTICLE I.

     RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES.

1.
All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and
unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and
liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and pro­tecting property, and of pursuing
and obtaining safety and happiness.

.

9.
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but the Legislature may
authorize the trial of civil causes by a jury of six persons when the matter in
dispute does not exceed fifty dollars. The Legislature may provide that in any
civil cause a verdict may be rendered by not less than five-sixths of the jury.
The Legislature may authorize the trial of the issue of mental incompetency
without a jury.

21.
This enumeration of rights and privileges shall not be construed to impair or
deny others retained by the people

.

(
Excerpt from Original Verified Complaint)

BRIAN D. ASARNOW

55 Community Place

Long Branch, NJ 07740

732-870-2570

Pro Se Plaintiff

BRIAN D. ASARNOW,
SUPERIOR COURT
OF
NEW JERSEY,

LAW
DIVISION
Plaintiff,
MERCER
COUNTY

vs.

Docket No. MER-L- 2798-02

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW
JERSEY,

Civil Action:

Defendants,

VERIFIED
COMPLANT

Plaintiff, Brian Asarnow, New Jersey resident and owner in fee of and doing
business at those premises

commonly known as 55
Community Place, referenced on the Municipal Tax Map as Block 237 Lot 22, in the
City of Long Branch, County of Monmouth and State of New Jersey, by way of
Verified Complaint against the defendants herein, says:

FIRST COUNT

1.    In two
matters heard without jury before the New Jersey Superior Court originating in
the Monmouth vicinage,  Plaintiff alleges the courts knowingly engaged
in arbitrary and invidious discrimination in the denial of Plaintiff’s

APPENDIX F

procedural and
substantive due process and equal

protection rights
relating to the above  commercial property, and that this has caused and
continues to cause damage to Plaintiff. Such rights are guaranteed to US
citizens under the due process/equal  protection clause of the 14th
Amendment to the US Constitution and reaffirmed in New Jersey’s own Consitution
as set forth below. As stated in Plaintiff’s Tort

Notice served November
20, 2000, Plaintiff alleges the reasons for this are from neglect of duty on the
part of

the State in allowing its
courts and judges to deliberately and recklessly engage in said deprivations
with impunity as regards claimant, and on information and belief, others
similarly situated and aggrieved, due to personal,  political or other
reasons. ..

In the first matter, the
court, upon a 2.5 month deliberation during which time within Plaintiff alleges
influence may have been exerted, contrived to find that within Plaintiff was
obligated to pay someone to store their car for them for three years though the
court would not find who was actually at fault for causing the incident or why.
On July 9, 1998 following a bench trial in a “replevin” matter known as
Schneider v. Asarnow, Docket  MON L-2377-96, involving within
Plaintiff’s storing of plaintiff’s automobile for him,

(Exhibit A) judgment was
entered against within Plaintiff in the amount of  $5,000
compensatory damages

plus interest and costs of
suit alleging deterioration and depreciation of a stored automobile as the
reason..

Within Plaintiff
counterclaimed for his storage fees and just compensation (quantum meriut) which
was denied. An Appeal was filed and rubber stamped/ upheld this decision
(Exhibit B) and a Petition for Certification with the NJ Supreme Court was then
filed and which was denied

None of this made the slightest sense since all the hard evidence produced at
trial clearly demonstrates

plaintiff’s knowledge of the
closing taking place on the building which he formerly owned and which within
Plaintiff acquired in foreclosure and in which he continues to run his
businesses,  yet refusal to remove his one remaining vehicle or pay
any storage fees.

This hard evidence consists of plaintiff Schneider’s  own admissions
(Exhibit D) , and receipt by his live-in housekeeper/agent, whom within
Plaintiff  testified he had previously met at plaintiff Schneider’s
residence and which was not refuted by Schneider, of two certified letters
which he chose to ignore, informing him of the need to remove by closing or that
fees would incur and a lien on the vehicle be

sought for payment
thereafter (as allowed under the garagekeepers act).  The trial judge
brushed aside this

hard evidence and its
implications as to an implied agreement and focused only on whether any oral

agreement existed for
storage since he knew this nontangible is immune from further review. Instead,
he seemed content to believe plaintiff’s assertion that he did not see either
letter until reading them at trial despite the fact that they were given to
his attorney during discovery a year and a half prior and referred to by
plaintiff in one of his handwritten notes. This would seem to be fraud
and theft of services yet

the court refused to take
judicial notice of this or the constructive notice given to Schneider and his
assent

thereto. As the
record shows plaintiff was given ample access to remove his vehicle around the
closing, and the trial Court found he didn’t make clear unambiguous demand until
nine months later , after already receiving benefit and thereby signifying his
assent, and found he suffered no loss of use or sale and therefore wasn’t about
to use the vehicle found to be inoperable and which he had stored previously for
many years in the exact same building, and found further that “plaintiff did not
have any right to leave the vehicle on the defendant’s property free of
charge”,  the decision not to award within Plaintiff any
compensation seemed unfair, to say the least, and violates the doctrine of
quantum meriut, a

substantive right.

That Plaintiff should
have to pay someone for the privilege of storing their vehicle for them for
three years seems totally absurd and unjust. That the Appellate Div. and NJ
Supreme Court should rubber stamp all this shocks the conscience and has
deprived within Plaintiff of his aforementioned rights  and property
(income) without due process.

Also, though the commercial building was formerly an auto body shop and contains
garages and within plaintiff submitted a myriad of evidence showing how he
performed as garage keeper, the trial court held that he was not entitled to be
a garage-keeper and attempted to support this position by citing two cases which
had no relevance.

Petitioner believes
the above result was not ultimately due to errors or omissions committed
by the three courts but by the willful, intentional disregard of his
substantive rights including the right to a full, fair, disinterested
disposition that equally considers and applies all  relevant laws.

All three courts had before them the same arguments, errors and omissions
pointed out by Asarnow.

 All three courts had
the same relevant doctrines, case-law, and precedents submitted by Asarnow in
addition to the hard evidence of record.  The trial judge, in the motion
for reconsideration  acknowledges Asarnow raising the doctrines of
equitable estoppel as to who is the wrongdoer, laches as to timely demand,
avoidable consequences, lack of any proximate damages, and implied assent, (no
mention is made of quantum meriut or just compensation) yet refuses to properly
apply them which would result in an entirely

different outcome. He seeks
to avoid liability for plaintiff Schneider, a millionaire, under quantum meriut
by alleging that he earlier appeared to take his vehicle and wasn’t given
it  thus contradicting the court’s own earlier finding that clear
unambiguous demand was not made for nine months thus disbelieving Schneider’s
story of an alleged earlier attempt. This was not the only contradiction made by
the trial court of its own earlier findings in attempting to support its
decision. As stated earlier, though finding “plaintiff did not have

any right to leave the
vehicle on the defendant’s property free of charge” it failed,
nevertheless,  to hold Plaintiff Schneider accountable for any storage fees
or for any losses as a consequence of his own action and refused to award
any compensation to within Plaintiff. Despite the Court’s resistance and
refusal  to accept testimony related to the CPI manual, the only means
available at hand to attempt to place a value on the vehicle in question,
nevertheless  the Court, in its decision,  decides to use the CPI
value of $13,00 for a vehicle in fair condition and nevertheless
misapplies this since the vehicle at hand was in less than fair condition
and not drivable by all accounts and testimony.

As all three courts had these and other “errors” brought to their attention and
refused to remedy them though having the laws conveniently placed before them,
and obviously knowing that unremedied they would deprive Asarnow of his
substantive rights, they can no longer be considered just error. The
rubber stamping of the decision by the higher courts upon “review” while
appearing procedurally to afford due process, further denies
actual procedural (fair, impartial) or substantive due process on these
same key issues affecting within Plaintiff’s substantive rights. Had the
conclusions of the trial court and failure to apply the proper laws been in

error, surely these two
higher courts would have corrected this. That they are satisfied that there is
no error at the end of the State process indicates their own willful
assent to the arbitrary, unconscionable deprivation of  Plaintiff Asarnow’s
substantive rights.

As stated in Plaintiff’s
Tort claims Notice, when Plaintiff attempted to make the Administrative Office
of the Courts of NJ (AOC) aware of the players and reasons for this treatment by
the lower and Appeals Court, he was rebuffed and told he would have to do his
own investigation and given an example by Mr. Monahan of AOC’s Advisory
Committee on Judicial Conduct of a  prisoner who had hanged himself due to
an unjust decision by a trial judge, and that only in that type of instance
would the AOC get off their chairs and

investigate. Mr. Monahan
also referred to an individual whom claimant alleges is an intermediary in the
interference with some of his rights and who has unrestricted access to the
judges under guise as county bar association president, by his nickname
indicating the fruitlessness of this approach and likelihood that the individual
has since been told about this.  Furthermore as claimant is unaware
of  any steps taken by the Attorney General’s office to prosecute Plaintiff
Schneider for the obvious fraud perpetrated upon the Court to attain his
judgment, with the court’s apparent assent, since bring brought to the Court’s
and later DAG Derry’s

attention (Federal Amended
Complaint), this indicates the States assent to the continued deprivation of
claimant’s rights.

5. In another matter, Asarnow v. City of Long Branch, et
al. Docket MON-L-5080-98 brought as a prerogative writ and a 42 U.S.C. Sec
1983 action involving civil rights issues relating to Plaintiff’s property… In
that matter Plaintiff shows the City knew of egregious zoning violations on
neighboring properties well before 10/7/98 when the complaint was filed yet
refuses to properly enforce while simultaneously maintaining all its ordinances
are readily  and uniformly enforced. (Mayor’s deposition: “only a phone
call is needed to have ordinances enforced”) This constitutes selective
enforcement  and deprivation of equal protection of the laws. The facts of
that record show LB engaged in harassment, retaliation  and selective
enforcement and restricts Plaintiff’s use of his property after Plaintiff sought

enforcement of  its
ordinances. It and its municipal court perpetrated numerous  other misdeeds
in violation of

Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights and have caused losses to and distress to Plaintiff.   In its
frivolous counterclaims LB sought to force Plaintiff to make improvements based
upon a mere zoning permit, install sewer service though having no jurisdiction
to do so, and claims violations exist though no summons issued.

When Plaintiff under
pressure to install sewer service decides to do so, LBSA changes its Rules to
force

Plaintiff to pay the
cost of the extension while his neighbors have not and colludes with  LB to
deny necessary permits unless LBSA contractors are used. As. related in claimant
brief and at the hearing. these new rules appear to be fraudently concocted.
state no effective date and did not surf act until 21/2 years after claimant’s
application for sewer service and appear designed solely to avoid its statutory
responsibilities and have claimant pay for and do its work. The former chairman
of LBSA, present when the actual new rules were adopted affirms claimant’s
position.

All was in evidence before
the courts in Plaintiff’s briefs.

6.      The assignment
judge first prevented Plaintiff from obtaining any injunctive relief  for
the illegal use of

neighboring commercial
properties despite the close proximity and severe inconvenience claiming not an

action in lieu of
prerogative writ. No hearing was afforded.

 7.     The second
pretrial judge, affirmed the denial of standing without prejudice stating
petitioner was not an ombudsman and dismissed 4 counts of the complaint which
sought non sec 1983 damages.

8.      The third
pretrial judge ended discovery suddenly without notice or warning when Plaintiff
made a

motion to obtain non-evasive
answers, documents, depositions, expert reports and public records which
he

had been seeking for
months and to which he is entitled,  when Plaintiff appeared to be
close to getting additional useful discovery, and Defendants objected using the
guise of  harassment, one of Plaintiff’s allegations/counts.
 

9. The fourth and last
pretrial judge was a conflicts judge for another who had to be twice recused due
to his previous professional relationship with the sewerage authority attorney
and as evidenced by the conflict judge’s summary decision, the two may have
discussed the matter with the same objective in mind. A comparison of this
“good” judges transcript decision of November 3,  2000 (Exhibit L ) to the
Amended Complaint and brief will show that he only adjudicated on selective
enforcement and the sewer issue of the remaining 13  counts of the Amended
Complaint as no findings exist as required by law as to these others.

The Appeal decision
(Exhibit O, Pg 11-2) affirms only two issues were dealt with. Yet he casually
and summarily dismissed these other Federal counts contrary to law though
genuine differences  were demonstrated to exist in the briefs between the
parties for each count.  In the two adjudicated counts, he would not let a
jury determine the facts as to whether  selective enforcement
exists, deciding it did not despite the above  and other evidence.
The court had the papers to review for 2 weeks each on two occasions yet the

court’s unfamiliarity with
the two briefs (both defendant’s filed motions for summary judgment) is
especially

evident in findings related
to the sewerage authority rules. The court first asks at court the empowering
statute

number and asks that the
statute be brought to the court for an obvious first review of  this
important issue (11/3/00TR. 18-12) After a 5 minute review of the statute (the
transcript indicates no time or attention or break being given to review
the statute) a decision is made that deals with the usage and connection fees,
an issue not in dispute, and not with who pays for the cost of extending the
main, the issue in dispute. The court found LBSA can make whatever rules it
wants (though being in conflict with empowering Statutes and the

equal protection clause of
the US Constitution).  The court did find however that Long Branch may have
unjustly denied Plaintiff consideration for permits. (Order, Exhibit M)

11.       A
motion for reconsideration was filed April 20, 2002 in the  Appellate Div.
and Plaintiff has sent

letters to the
Administrative  Office of the Courts (AOC) and Chair of the Senate
Judiciary Committee

advising of the denial of
due process and asking them to have investigated  the apparent
political/judicial

corruption behind these
unlawful,  unjust decisions. Judiciary Committee has deferred to AOC
which  has determined everything is “A-OK” with AOC.  Though AOC
is headed by a judge appointed by the NJ Supreme Court to oversee  the
courts and see that judges enforce the laws, an earlier letter  from AOC
disavows this and states that only an Appellate or Supreme  Court judge can
determine whether laws are applied, and not  AOC (Exhibit P )
This appearance of, but lack of true accountability, coupled  with the

hearing of only 100 cases a
year by the US Supreme Court  and the news media’s failure to cover this
explains why some judges  feel they can get away with failing to do their
job and enforce the laws which they vowed to uphold.

13. As a direct consequence
of the stress of being treated as a second class citizen and in prosecuting his
rights, Plaintiff has been depressed and on or about January 2002 was diagnosed
with type II diabetes which has had further impact on his way of life.

14.
As a result of the aforesaid and other willful unlawful actions of Defendants
New Jersey and New Jersey Superior Court under color of state law, Plaintiff has
been deprived of procedural due process or a fair, impartial, disinterested
disposition on all issues raised, substantive due process, equal
protection/application of laws and a jury trial as demanded in his prior
complaints and has been thereby harmed. This violates Plaintiffs rights under
the Seventh and Fourteenth Amendment- Section 1. of the US Constitution
and Article 1- Sections 1,9 and 21 of The Constitution of New Jersey.

WHEREFORE,
Plaintiff, Brian D. Asarnow, demands trial by a jury pursuant to N.J.S.A 52:4A-l
and the Seventh Amendment of the US Constitution and Article I Section 9 of The
New Jersey Constitution based upon the existing record, with judgment against
the Defendants, New Jersey and New Jersey Superior Court for:

A. A jury verdict, finding that the Defendants have willfully, invidiously,
unconscionably or otherwise not in error deprived Plaintiff of his rights under
the Seventh and Fourteenth Amendment- Section 1. of the US Constitution and
Article 1- Sections 1,9 and 21 of The Constitution of New Jersey.

B.
A jury verdict awarding compensatory damages in the amount of $26,350 as of
August 26, 2002 for the automobile and $100,000 due to property devaluation
incurred based upon two appraisals and installation of a sewer main extension
and due to costs associated with arbitrary actions of Long Branch, or other
amounts calculated by the jury.

C.
A jury verdict awarding consequential damages to Plaintiff of $200,000 for loss
of his constitutional rights, loss of his way of life, and emotional, physical
and medical distress including diabetes and depression resulting from being
treated as a second class citizen, or other amount calculated by the
jury.

D. Any Attorney fees and costs of suit and appeals as allowed under common
law.

E. For such other and further relief as a jury may deem equitable and just and
be entitled to find including punitive damages considering Defendant’s willful,
invidious and unconscionable deprivation of Plaintiffs substantive
rights.

  

SECOND
COUNT

1.
Plaintiff Brian D. Asarnow, repeats each and every allegation of the First Count
of the Complaint as if same were fully set forth at length herein, and makes
same a part of this Count.

2.
Defendant’s actions in depriving Plaintiff of his rights and treating him as a
second class citizen stems from a policy of deliberate indifference to those
rights due to a lack of real judicial accountability and negligence in
preventing and in allowing the torts to continue unabated.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Brian D. Asarnow, demands trial by a jury pursuant to
N.J.S.A 52:4A-l and N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 et seq., and the Seventh Amendment of the US
Constitution and Article I Section 9 of The New Jersey Constitution based upon
the existing record, with judgment against the Defendants, New Jersey and New
Jersey Superior Court for:

A. A
jury verdict, finding that the Defendants are negligent under N.J.S.A 59:1-1 et
seq. in failing to prevent the aforementioned constitutional, mental and
physical torts and for allowing this to continue unabated thru a policy of
deliberate indifference, and not otherwise in error.

B. A jury verdict awarding damages to Plaintiff of $200,000 for loss of his
constitutional rights, loss of his way of life, and emotional, physical and
medical distress including diabetes and depression resulting from being treated
as a second class citizen, or such other amount the jury may calculate.

C. Any Attorney fees and costs of suit and appeals as allowed under common
law.

D. For such other and further relief as a jury may deem equitable and just and
be entitled to find including punitive damages considering Defendant’s gross
negligence in preventing and in allowing the aforementioned constitutional,
mental and physical torts to occur to Plaintiff’s detriment.

______________

Brian D. Asarnow

Pro Se Plaintiff

Dated:
August 26, 2002        

Excerpt from Third Amended
Complaint

16.
On August 29, 2003 a different, experienced,  Monmouth judge outrageously,
unlawfully and not in error,

Ordered
that Plaintiff pay $3022.93 as costs in the Long Branch matter, though knowingly
having no jurisdiction

to do so
and to purposefully force another appeal and which further evidences the
purposeful denial of due process and targeting of  Plaintiff.

On or
about May 6, 2003 Long Branch (LB) filed a motion for costs at the trial level
attempting to improperly use the standard Supreme Court order which allows costs
upon denial of petition to attempt to garner $3022.93 in costs for all levels.
(The Appellate Order was silent as to costs)

 The
judge would give LB three bites/chances to attempt this though knowing he had
no jurisdiction to fix costs as to

the
Appellate and Supreme Court since the parties had foreclosed the issue of
costs at the trial and Appellate level by consenting to a legally binding
voluntary withdrawal on all remaining issues due to the earlier judge’s failure
to adjudicate these issues and so an appeal could be had. After earlier
appearing to limit costs to the Appellate and Supreme Court levels, the court
did an about face and on August 29, 2003 awarded virtually all the costs sought
by Plaintiff (it forgot to add the $40 last sought by LB). This despite the
above and using Plaintiff’s  voluntary settlement/withdrawal of  the
surviving permit issue as evidence it was without merit and as further proof
that LB prevailed. (LB also withdrew three claims, which the court
ignored)  It sadly seized upon a 1938 case offered by LB which predates the
governing cost statutes as cover to take jurisdiction of the Appellate and
Supreme Court costs. It was pointed out to the court that its behavior goes
against strongest public policy to

settle
disputes as does its encouraging an appeal due to its arbitrary reversal and
findings. (The court sadly states

that
since taxpayer dollars are involved, it is following public policy by awarding
the public entity whatever costs it wants, though having no jurisdiction to
do so.) The court also fails to substantively tax costs as required by
statute and ignores arguments that the actual costs sought are either not
allowed or necessary under the statutes.

One
wonders how this experienced judge could who claims to have previously
considered costs motions,  nevertheless, acts as if having no prior
knowledge in properly deciding costs which are statutory and thereby meant to
prevent just this sort of abuse. It seems obvious from the record that neither
LB or the court had traveled this road before and that the court must have
therefore felt it had cover to do this.

17.
Upon information and belief the breadth of the denial of Plaintiff’s meaningful
access to the courts by the various courts may in part be due to the willingness
and readiness of those courts to become influenced by third parties due to the
aforementioned lack of accountability and credible deterrence.  This
would also violate CJC 1 thru 3.

18.
Upon information and belief; the courts may have acted in bad faith,
displayed an interest  and discriminated against Plaintiff as evidenced by
the consistent denial of his substantive rights. Plaintiff’s neighbor with
no approvals for its illegal, non-conforming use, is a snow removal contractor
for NJDOT. On or about May 25, 2003 NJDOT removed at least 6 plows from E&L
lots which lack approvals and the use of which  depreciates Plaintiff’s
property.

19. Upon
information and belief; then members of the senate judiciary committee, which
recommends the appointment and removal of judges for the most part practice law
before these same courts and this inherent conflict may explain their resistance
to taking enforcement action against the judiciary for knowingly and
purposefully failing to enforce court rules, laws and public policy and the US
and NJ Constitutions as required under the C.J.C.

20.   Upon
information and belief, The Director of the AOC is appointed by the Chief
Justice of the NJ Supreme Court and key employees are political appointees and
AOC has an inherent conflict on the one hand of wanting the courts appear to be
impartial and deliberate, and on the other hand of disciplining judges and
thereby admitting fault with the court system. Upon information and belief it is
rare if at all that judges are terminated in NJ for egregiously denying
procedural and substantive due process to claimants as required by the CJC, not
in error, and though the case-law is conveniently placed in front of them.

21.   As a
direct consequence of the courts failure to provide access for the vindication
of his substantive rights and in being treated us a second class citizen,
Plaintiff has incurred real losses and damages as detailed in his Tort
Notice, portions of which are attached hereto as exhibit O provided as a
courtesy as to the constitutional claims so to enable Defendant to investigate
them. Upon information and belief and based upon the recent decision as to
costs, Defendant has not as yet done so and remains deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff’s rights.